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Abstract 
 
The hopes of customary communities in Indonesia have recently been bolstered by 
Constitutional Court assurances that they have the right to control customary forest. There 
are, however, several obstacles to making successful claims, and there are also many 
situations in which forest users and customary land claimants do not stand to benefit from the 
recent rulings. This policy review analyses the court decisions, politics around their 
implementation, and considerations of types of land claimants who are excluded from the 
current process. We highlight groups of forest and ex-forestland users that are excluded from 
benefiting from the Constitutional Court decisions and are adversely affected by land use 
change and re-designation of land. These groups include those with claims over land in 
conservation areas, allocated to concessionaires for resource extraction, on land already 
issued to them through forest management rights, and those whose land has already been 
removed from the State forest land.  
Highlights: 
● Contestations around claims by customary groups on forest areas in Indonesia have 
been rejuvenated by 2011 and 2012 Constitutional Court decisions. 
● There remains significant confusion around how to apply the laws, however both 
State and customary community rights groups are actively advancing their 
preparations 
● The Constitutional Court decisions are specific to ‘customary communities’ with 
claims over State forest land.  
● Communities with claims over gazetted national parks, land issued for forestry 
concessions, land removed from the State forest, and migrants remain without legal 
basis for claiming forest land.  
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1. Introduction 
Customary forest users in Indonesia have long made claims over forestland defined and 
controlled by the State. Indigenous rights organisations estimate that approximately 40 
million hectares of Indonesian State forestland should be under customary control (AMAN 
2013). In 2011 and 2012, the Constitutional Court ruled with claimants1 on three landmark 
rulings (collectively called the ‘Constitutional Court decisions’ in this paper) that challenged 
some provisions in the 1999 Forestry Law among others. The first decision was that the 
rights of all communities must be respected and protected in the implementation of the 
State’s control over State forests (hutan negara). This ruling will be referred to in this article 
as MK 34 (MK34/PUU-IX/2011). The second was MK 35 (MK35/PUU-X/2012) in which 
hutan adat (customary forests) were recognised  as a new category of hutan hak (titled 
forests),2 the second of two categories of forests listed in Article 6 of the 1999 Forestry Law. 
Hutan adat, under this decision, should be considered outside State forestland.3 Along with 
State forestland, titled forests should be recognised as one type of forestland tenure. The 
third, MK 45 (MK45/PUU-IX/2011) changed the meaning of ‘state forest zone’ (kawasan 
hutan) to include only areas that have been vetted through a gazettement process. This meant 
that the process of determining forest boundaries, which includes the consultation of 
customary and local forest users, must be undertaken before forestland can be placed under 
the purview of the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MoEF).4 These three decisions 
were supported by a broader adat movement and Indigenous rights organisations (especially 
AMAN [Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara]) (Rachman and Siscawati 2016). The decisions 
are significant for the confirmation of existing laws. The laws themselves are not ‘new,’ but 
the Constitutional Court decisions inject new political and legal clout to customary claims 
over forests.   
 
By October 2016, AMAN, the Indonesian Network for Participatory Mapping (Jaringan 
Kerja Pemetaan Partisipatif [JKPP]), and the Ancestral Domain Registration Agency (Badan 
Registrasi Wilayah Adat [BRWA]) had mapped 932 individual customary forests covering 
7.3 million hectares of customary territory, most of which overlaps with State forestland. 
Only seven of these areas have been verified by BRWA, an association led by customary 
communities. Two of these areas were issued ‘certificates’ by BRWA, which aims to position 
these areas for formal claims to the State.5 In addition, 34% of all identified areas are in West 
                                                            
1 Claimants were Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (AMAN) and customary leaders on MK 35 and private 
and formal leaders on MK 34 and 45. 
2 The term ‘titled forests’ includes both individual and collective titles and is literally translated as “rights 
forests,” but we use translation that is consistent with the official translation of the law, which is ‘title forests,’ 
which is used by several authors (e.g., Sahide and Giessen 2015). Other authors refer to this as ‘privately owned 
forests’ (e.g., Indrarto et al. 2012; Fujiwara et al. 2011), which we also consider appropriate. 
3 The question of whether hutan adat remain inside or should be considered outside State forests remains a 
subject of debate, but the current interpretation by the MoEF is that they should remain inside State forests. 
4 Prior to October 2014, this was the Ministry of Forestry (MoF). We use both ministry names depending on the 
context. 
5 The State does not officially recognise BRWA certificates and has its own process called the IP4T 
(Inventarisasi Penguasaan, Pemilikan, Penggunaan dan Pemanfaatan Tanah/Inventory Control, Ownership, 
Use, and Utilisation of Land), which is jointly managed by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MoEF), 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Kementerian Dalam Negeri), and the National Land Agency (Kementerian 
Agraria dan Tata Ruang/Badan Pertanahan Nasional). Only the result of the IP4T is sufficient for the State to 
release the land from the Forest Zone. The District Head (Bupati) issues a Peraturan Daerah (District Law), 
which would formally authorise hutan adat within the District’s powers, but the authority to release the land is 
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Kalimantan, 14% of the areas are in North Sumatera, 9% of the areas are in South Sulawesi, 
and the rest of the areas are distributed among other provinces (BRWA 2016a; BRWA 
2016b). The first nine customary forest claims were recognised formally by the State on 
December 30, 2016, covering 13,122 hectares (Fanani 2017).   
 
In this review, we discuss the events leading up to and following the Constitutional Court 
decisions. Our focus is on who, among the claimants of the forests, stands to benefit from 
these decisions and associated regulations and who, among marginalised forest users, do not. 
We argue that while the Constitutional Court decisions are an important step forward for 
customary forest users, many groups of forest users (among them the most disadvantaged) 
are excluded from accessing these avenues to benefit from forests and forest resources. At the 
end of this article, we make several recommendations for the claims process for both hutan 
adat and the forgotten communities that are invisible under the Constitutional Court rulings. 
Indonesian forest use and designation terminologies are overlapping and often confusing. We 
clarify them here and bracket the Indonesian term for clarity. The focus of this article is on 
hutan adat, which means ‘customary forests’ but we maintain the Indonesian term because of 
the embedded meanings of ‘adat,’ which we discuss briefly. We use hutan adat to mean the 
legal definition of customary forests as described in MK 35, as opposed to regionally 
designated customary forests at the district (kabupaten) or provincial levels. We refer to the 
forest management regimes of village forests (hutan desa), community forests (hutan 
kemasyarakatan), and people’s plantations (hutan tanaman rakyat) collectively as ‘social 
forestry’ and individually by their Indonesian names to avoid ambiguity. The entire forest 
zone (kawasan hutan) is under the responsibility of the MoEF, but the State has direct control 
over State forests (hutan negara) and only influences the scope of activities that can be 
undertaken in titled forests (hutan hak). The forest zone is designated for specific uses, 
broadly including production forests (hutan produksi), protection forests (hutan lindung), and 
conservation forests (hutan konservasi).6 
 
This article is based on the independent research initiatives of the authors. Therefore, we 
provide examples from several regions of Indonesia that involve diverse data collection and 
analysis methods to strengthen our review. Our aim is to consolidate some of the key findings 
of these studies and come to a parsimonious set of insights and recommendations that 
culminate in a policy review. Consequently, we do not purport to provide new empirical 
evidence in this paper. We base our analysis on previous data and works both published and 
unpublished. We specifically focus on customary forests in Indonesia, but we are aware of 
the greater forces at play that are tied in with global capitalist notions of conservation and 
natural resource management.  
 
Before explaining the processes leading up to the Constitutional Court decisions and the 
results of these decisions, we explore the forest tenure security in Indonesia. We look at the 
basis for claim-making among communities and what the Constitutional Court decisions 
mean for land claims both within and outside of State forestland. We then analyse who stands 
to benefit from these decisions and who does not. We consider this an important and 
unaddressed aspect of the Constitutional Court rulings. Our intent is not to diminish the 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
within the auspices of IP4T. At the time of writing, data on the progress of IP4T were not available, and there 
were no known cases of recognition of hutan adat by the IP4T. 
6 There are more nuanced breakdowns and variations of these categories, but this simplified categorisation will 
suffice for this discussion. 
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importance of the Constitutional Court decisions, as we believe they are an unprecedented 
step forward for forest user rights in Indonesia.  Our focus is on forest and forest resource 
users who fall outside the contested definitions of communities that are entitled to benefit 
from the Constitutional Court decisions and subsequent ‘new’ laws. Finally, we make several 
recommendations after a brief discussion. 
2. Forest tenure security in Indonesia 
Indonesia’s Forestry Law (number 41/1999) stipulates that the State designates the forest 
zone (kawasan hutan) to affirm the designation of permanent forests (hutan tetap). The 
process of gazetting the forest zone includes designating specific land as an indicative forest 
estate, ground-truthing and verifying the land (including considering community land 
claims), and finally establishing delineation (penataan batas) until the enactment (penetapan) 
of such land as a definitive forest estate. MK 45 confirms that the legality of zoning of 
forestland will be determined by this entire process. 
Indonesia’s forest zone (especially State forests) is central to national forestry planning and 
operates under ‘scientific’ forestry principles (Peluso 1992). Under this system, the State is 
the key actor that ensures the efficient control and management of forest resources (Peluso 
and Vandergeest 2001). This system was inherited from the Dutch colonial government, 
which established territoriality in Java through a policy of Domain Declaration. Upon 
independence, the State implemented the Javanese forest management system in Forest Law 
5/67 in the entire archipelago (Barr et al. 2006; Maryudi 2015b). The policy stated that any 
unowned land was the State’s domain. Forests were often considered as ‘empty’ or 
‘wasteland’ and were the first territories grabbed by the Dutch (and subsequently the State) 
for forestry and other uses, particularly when debates about customary claims had not been 
resolved (Peluso, Afiff, and Rachman 2008).7  
 
The Indonesian national government adopts the concept of the State’s right of control over 
forests (hak menguasai negara) in which the State is not the forest owner as assumed in the 
Domain Declarations, but it is a representative of the Indonesian people charged with 
controlling the forests by applying its statutory authority to allocate, regulate, and determine 
legal relations amongst citizens with regard to the forests. In practice, the State performs as 
the owner by controlling and limiting people’s access to forests and making agreements on 
forest use (ijin) and forestland exchange (tukar-menukar), including agreements on forestland 
that has not yet been gazetted. 
 
Adat claimants, on the other hand, use the basis of custom (often defined differently and 
overly complex to summarise in this review) to make their claims. We explore the differences 
of framing land tenure claims here. 
 
2.1 Legal basis for land tenure 
Forest Law 41/1999 defines both State and privately titled forests within the State forest 
zone, although the latter rarely existed prior to hutan adat. State forests, as discussed, are 
located on land without any formal land rights, while titled forests are located on titled land, 
which could include private ownership, use rights, or right for commercial cultivation rights 
as regulated by Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) number 5 of 1960. The enactment of the 
                                                            
7 This logic also extends to transmigration programmes in which the State considered outer islands as empty and 
requiring  to develop (Taylor 2003).  
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BAL was intended to bridge the gap between ‘Western’ law and customary law by providing 
registration of individual land rights, while also continuing to recognise customary land law 
concepts and institutions (Wright 2011). Prior to May 16, 2013, the day the Constitutional 
Court ruled on MK 35, customary forests were assumed to be part of State forests. Collective 
tenures were treated as weak rights of usufruct (Colchester 2002). According to the 
Constitutional Court rulings, this assumption was not aligned with Indonesia’s Constitution, 
which recognises the existence of customary users and their rights. The Constitutional Court 
corrected the understanding of the MoEF in the Forestry Law by stating that hutan adat are 
part of titled forests, but they are still within the State forest zone (i.e., still considered 
‘forests’ by the MoEF). The MoEF has the power to grant licenses for utilising national 
forests to private companies or local communities and to directly manage conservation 
forests, but have no such powers on titled forestland. 
 
Even before the Constitutional Court decisions, there were already several ways that local 
forest users could gain management rights over State forests.  These schemes were not 
directly changed by the Constitutional Court decisions. Village forests (hutan desa [HD]) 
licences are granted to village institutions, and community forests (hutan kemasyarakatan 
[HKm]) and People’s Planted Forest (hutan tanaman rakyat [HTR]) licences are issued to 
community groups, such as producer associations or co-operatives. The HTR scheme aims to 
encourage local people to engage in more financial-oriented forest practices to accelerate the 
development of timber plantations, while the HKm and HD schemes usually encourage 
smaller scale community-based livelihoods activities. The HTR scheme was principally 
driven by the slow progress of large-scale/industrial plantation forests (Hutan Tanaman 
Industri). Further partnerships can be developed between communities and State-owned 
enterprises for the management of private forest concessions. Table 1 shows the similarities 
and differences among these schemes. 
 
Table 1: Arrangements for HKm, HD, and HTR social forestry schemes 
  HKm HD HTR 
Scope Group or cooperative 
use rights over: 
-Timber from planted 
trees (only in Production 
Forests) 
-Non-timber forest 
products 
-Environmental services 
  
Village management 
rights over: 
-Timber from both 
natural and planted 
forests (in Production 
Forest areas) 
-Non-timber forest 
products 
-Environmental services 
Individual or cooperative 
use rights in Production 
Forests under three different 
models: 
-Independent, established at 
own initiative and cost 
-Partnership or joint venture 
with plantation company 
-Led by a company under an 
outgrower scheme 
Conditionality Use subject to separate 
business license; not 
alienable and cannot be 
collateralised 
Use subject to separate 
business license 
Use rights granted at outset; 
not alienable and only 
planted trees can use be 
used for collateral 
Duration 35 years 35 years 60 years 
Adapted from Royo and Wells (2012) 
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Although there are several instruments legally available to communities to access forest 
resources, the impact of these models has been limited so far. By the end of 2014, the MoEF 
granted less than 1 million hectares of State forests for local communities. This was below 
their 2.5-million-hectare target. In production forests, approximately 97% was granted for 
corporations, and the remaining 3% was used for social forestry (Direktorat Jenderal 
Planologi Kehutanan 2014). 
 
The MoEF excludes hutan adat from forest estates. Ministerial Regulation 62/2013 
(Peraturan Menteri Kehutanan No. P.62/Menhut-II/2013), for instance, clearly states that 
customary territories located in forest zones that have been verified will be released from the 
forest zone. This is not in line with MK 35 and Law 41/1999, which stipulate that there are 
the two types of forests within the forest zone already discussed, but the MoEF understands 
its responsibility for only State forests within the forest zone. Despite this, customary users 
are bolstered by the Constitutional Court decisions. In the process of setting up their claims 
through participatory mapping and collecting, any evidence that they anticipate will be 
deemed acceptable proof of customary use by the MoEF. 
 
2.2 Adat in forest and land law 
Law 5 of 1960 (i.e., the BAL) recognises adat (customary or custom) law as coexisting with 
national law; however, few regulations have been introduced that relate directly to adat 
(Wright 2011). We note Ministry of Agriculture rule Permen Agraria 5/1999 as an exception 
in which customary land rights are recognised in non-forestland. Article 5 of the BAL reads 
as follows: 
The Agrarian law applies to the land, water and air space is customary law, to the 
extent that it is not contrary to national interest and the State, which is based on 
national unity, Indonesian socialism and the regulations contained in this Law and 
other regulations, and to any elements that rely on religious principles. 
 
Forestry Law 41/1999 effectively negated customary land tenure security for those with 
customary claims over forests by regulating that all forestland not owned under private land 
rights be directly controlled by the State. Within this, only claimants meeting the following 
criteria would be considered as having customary forests: (1) the society is organised as a 
distinguishable community; (2) there are existing structures and institutional arrangements; 
(3) there are clear territories and boundaries based on customary law; (4) customary law and 
customary judiciaries still exist; (5) societies still gather forest products to fulfil their daily 
needs; and (6) the claim has the support of the district government. These principles have 
been in place for 15 years, and yet Constitutional Court challenges were required to lead to 
hutan adat being realised in the country. 
 
The government often cited the BAL as a constraint to issuing hutan adat, in which it is 
stated that the allocation of land should not contradict national interests (Contreras-
Hermosilla and Fay 2005). Before the Constitutional Court decisions, Moeliono (2002) and 
Moniaga (1993; 2007) already questioned in what ways the role of national law and practices 
would erode adat traditions and  serve to integrate local communities politically, 
economically, and socially into the nation-state. 
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2.3 Gazettement of forestland 
Only a small portion of the forest zone had been gazetted before 2009. The Ministry of 
Forestry (MoF) stated that only 13.8 million hectares (11.29%) had been gazetted as national 
forestland (Kementerian Kehutanan 2013). Since the Constitutional Court decisions were 
made, the MoEF has put considerable efforts into gazetting forest estates. As Figure 1 shows, 
by the end of 2014, the MoEF had gazetted 76.5 million hectares of State forests or 
approximately 63% of the 121 million hectares of the State forest areas. This figure was up 
from 13.8 million hectares by the end of 2011 (unchanged since 2009). Almost 62 million 
hectares in 821 forest areas (units) were established in 2014 alone.  
 
While this recent accelerated effort has increased the area of ‘legal’ State forestland, it has 
further strained the contestations over the legitimacy of the process of defining land tenure 
security and control over Indonesia’s forests. Indigenous rights groups consider this influx a 
preventative action that will ensure continued State control over forests. A representative of 
the MoEF who we interviewed anonymously confirmed this as the Ministry's strategy. In the 
meantime, the MoEF has been engaged in consultations with a wide range of stakeholders to 
set the parameters for the operationalisation of hutan adat. While that process had been going 
on for 3 years, the Ministry quickly removed forest inventories that are eligible to be claimed 
(see Figure 1).8  
 
The Ministry requires the consent of community members to gazette forests, but the 
legitimacy of consent by community authorities is often questioned in such cases (Myers et 
al. 2016; see also Setiawan et al. 2016; Prabowo et al. 2017). A representative of a customary 
community organisation we interviewed suggested that the Ministry is gazetting forestland 
where there are minimal conflicts or movement from customary claimants. He also suggested 
that local people lack awareness of new provisions for hutan adat and, therefore, are not 
aware that by consenting to MoEF gazettement, they are making hutan adat claims more 
challenging in the future. Our respondent also mentioned that the MoEF generally explains 
social forestry initiatives to communities, but does not always explain that hutan adat are a 
form of titled forest (hutan hak), not right-to-use (hak pakai) forests. The Ministry often 
couples forest management arrangements with incentives, such as training and inputs and 
rubber seedlings, but no such provisions have been extended within hutan adat arrangements 
so far.  
 
An MoEF official who we interviewed was even more blunt in saying that community 
consultations were bypassed altogether, and forests were being gazetted based on digital maps 
with local ground-truthing based on the advice of local forest authorities only.  The official 
referred to this as a “time bomb waiting to go off.” 
 
  
                                                            
8 The targets for forest gazettement are laid out in the national planning document Rencana Pembangunan 
Jangka Menengah Nasional 2015–2019. 
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Figure 1: Progress of Forest Area Gazettement 2011–2014 
 
Data source: Direktorat Jenderal Planologi Kehutanan/Directorate General of Forestry 
Planning in Kementerian Lingkungan Hidup dan Kehutanan (2015) 
 
History shows us other examples of contrary regulations and laws, including the 
transmigration programme in which local inhabitants lost their rights to land to government-
sponsored migrant workers (Elmhirst 2011) and the issuance of licences to forestry, 
plantation, and mining companies on adat lands without consultation, let alone 
implementation of free, prior, informed consent (FPIC) (Barr 2006; Colchester et al. 2006). 
Contestations of these contrasts are voiced by community groups, nongovernmental 
organisations (NGOs), customary rights organisations, different levels of government, and 
companies. We deliberately take a broader focus than customary users alone, as many of the 
contestations revealed in this review are not from customary users, but local communities 
more generally. We also acknowledge that the term adat is increasingly politically charged 
and provides the illusion that it somehow represents all customary communities in Indonesia, 
when actual claims and interests of these communities can be themselves divergent and 
conflicting (Henley 2007; Bettinger, Fisher, and Miles 2014). 
 
2.4 Framing of land tenure claims 
Claims are strengthened and legitimised by customary users wielding adat as a political tool 
(Henley and Davidson 2007). Claimants make claims to customary and statutory institutions 
with the aspirations of obtaining not simply usage rights, but ownership rights over land to 
which they assert they are entitled through use, cultural identity, and historical statutory 
rights.  The claimants’ legitimacy is found in the institutions that recognise their claims, 
including non-State institutions (e.g., customary institutions). In turn, these institutions seek 
recognition for their claims through State authorities (cf. Lund 2010; Sikor and Stahl 2011). 
Some of these claims against the State have been ongoing for generations (cf. Myers and 
Muhajir 2015).  
 
Here, we explore several ways in which villagers claim forestland and what kinds of rights 
they embed in their claims. State, international, and supranational conventions addressing the 
recognition of rights provide robust support for claims framed by customary rights––defined 
by law, custom, and convention. However, customary claims are not reliant on these external 
institutions for their own legitimacy. Approaching rights to the forests can be seen from a 
human rights perspective, such as land rights as property rights, cultural rights for customary 
communities, gender equality rights, rights for adequate housing, and food security rights 
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(Gilbert 2014). However, rights to forests viewed as a bundle of rights are more broad. This 
bundle of rights includes the rights to sell forest products, hold local governments 
accountable, secure legal tenure, derive economic benefits, and exercise individual and 
collective rights. Sikor et al. (2011) explain that forest tenure is the right to determine who 
holds and uses forestland and resources, for how long, and under what conditions. From the 
perspective of customary land tenure, customary users are “rightful owners and managers of 
all forests because they have ancestral claims that predate the arrival of the state” (Sunderlin 
2011, 21).  
 
Customary land claims in Indonesia are often championed by customary leaders or 
community activists empowered by leaders. This is a basis of claim-making found by others 
in parts of Africa (Neumann 1998; Watts 2004) and Indonesia specifically (Li 2007; Bakker 
and Moniaga 2010). The common bases of the claims include a distinct community, a 
customary leadership structure, defined boundaries, customary roles in place, and a 
customary leader (or leaders) that will ensure management of the land. This roughly aligns 
with the 1999 conditions for making claims on forestland in Indonesia; however, where the 
State frames these conditions under land (or property) conditions, adat claims are made on 
custom. Nevertheless, customary communities may shift their framing to align with concerns 
of the State. Watts and Bohle (1993) write about rights claims and food security, which serve 
as another basis for claim-making (more generally related to livelihoods). Some of the cases 
that we have researched in Indonesia have made claims to manage property on an 
environmental basis. For example, encroaching oil palm plantations could threaten 
community access to water or create flooding. Therefore, claims have been successfully 
made in Kalimantan for community forests so that the forestland will not be used by oil palm 
plantations (Myers et al. 2016). Hence, although the framings of land tenure claims may have 
different origins, they may converge with the logics of the State in order to be heard among 
State authorities.  
 
3. Who stands to benefit and who does not? 
Exactly which communities are considered ‘customary’ remains the interpretation of the 
State. Although the preliminary guidance was established in Forestry Law 41/1999 (see 
section 2), the implementation of the law remains malleable. Therefore, exactly ‘who 
benefits’ remains to be seen since these criteria were not applied prior to the Constitutional 
Court decisions. Community-based forest users who have no ability to make claims based on 
the Constitutional Court decisions are more clear, and we highlight some key contexts in 
which exclusion occurs here. 
 
We identify five situations in which community-based forest users do not stand to benefit 
from the Constitutional Court decisions. This analysis is not to minimise the Constitutional 
Court decisions, but it is to suggest that the decisions do not confirm the rights of all types of 
forest claimants, as we acknowledge they are not intended to do. We simply highlight that 
while MK 35 strictly applies to customary communities within the forest zone, MK 45 
applies to all forest users within the forest zone. Therefore, there are specific groups of both 
customary and non-customary forest users that do not stand to benefit from the rulings, 
indicating that further policies could be warranted using similar principles to that which are 
embodied in the Constitutional Court decisions.  First, customary users with claims over land 
exclusively outside the forest zone cannot benefit from the rulings. Second, forest users with 
claims over gazetted conservation forest areas, such as national parks, may not be able to 
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benefit from the rulings. Third, customary claims over land that has already been converted 
to non-forestland (Area Pengunaan Lain [APL]) are not able to make claims supported by the 
rulings. Fourth, forest users with statutory management rights may find their claims 
challenging. Fifth, transmigrant and forced migrant communities with claims over forestland 
would not be able to make claims on a customary basis. Here, we examine all five of these 
situations. 
 
3.1. Customary claims outside State forestland 
Between 2011 and 2014, 1.6 million hectares of forestland were converted to agricultural use 
(Kementerian Lingkungan Hidup dan Kehutanan 2015), usually for conversion to industrial 
activities. In Kalimantan, these activities are largely oil palm (cf. Setiawan et al. 2016). 
Because the authority over these lands was previously vested in the MoF, with no obligation 
to consult customary users on the change of the status of the land (nor for the appropriation of 
land into State forestland in the first place), there is little evidence of regard for customary 
claims in these land use conversions. Since 1999,9 Indonesia has required that industrial 
activities include an environmental impact assessment (AMDAL), which includes the 
consultation of communities, but does not specify the quality of consultation (Myers and 
Ardiansyah 2014). The AMDAL is initiated after land has already been converted to non-
forestland (cf. Setiawan et al. 2016). There are many documented cases of AMDALs gone 
wrong by either bypassing community consultation or applying sufficient pressure or 
incentives that community leaders endorse the AMDAL in service of their own interests 
(Colchester 2006; Myers and Ardiansyah 2014). Therefore, these communities are trebly 
disadvantaged. First, their lands were appropriated by the State to become State forests. Then, 
their land was issued to companies for industrial logging. Finally, former forestland may be 
converted for industrial agricultural use (such as oil palm) on which they have no basis for 
claim-making at a national level because their customary land is not included in the 
Constitutional Court rulings since it was removed from the forest zone. At subnational levels, 
some districts have established processes for customary land claims (see Pahlevi 2015). 
Further, the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) (2016) made a 
recommendation that communities whose land was removed from State forests for oil palm 
plantations have their land and rights restored and that the State has the responsibility to 
correct past human rights violations. 
 
3.2. Customary claims on conservation forest  
There are different interpretations of whether or not MK 35 applies to national parks and 
conservation areas. These areas are sometimes understood as regulated under Law 5/1990 on 
the conservation of biodiversity and ecosystems rather than Forestry Law 41/1999 
(Magdalena and Supriadi 2014), making them a special case for hutan adat. Others 
understand that the Constitutional Court decisions apply to all State forests, including 
national parks and protected forests. Hutan adat claims in conservation areas are particularly 
complicated because of the application of both laws (Magdalena and Supriadi 2014; The 
Samdhana Institute and Rights and Resources 2016). Law 5/1990 applies specifically to 
conservation and biodiversity and states that designated zones within conservation areas 
prohibit human activity (inti and rimba). These areas, argues the MoEF, would not be 
                                                            
9 The AMDAL was introduced in PP No.27/1999 Analisis Mengenai Dampak Lingkungan (Environmental 
Impact Analysis). 
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available for hutan adat claims. (We assume this means if they are gazetted, which we 
discuss in more detail later.) Other zones within conservation areas, known as livelihood 
zones (pemanfaatan), seem to be less clear candidates for hutan adat claims. 
 
The MoEF’s first policy response to the Constitutional Court decisions is detailed in 
Permenhut P 62/2013. It was highly critical of the implications of the implementations of the 
ruling for Indonesia’s conservation areas and national parks. The MoEF cited the concern 
that the release of conservation areas to hutan adat would put Indonesia’s forests in jeopardy 
and result in the loss of all conservation areas in Indonesia. The MoEF’s recommendation is 
that hutan adat remain within State forestland and, therefore, still under the control of the 
Ministry.  
 
Not all conservation areas have completed the exercise of gazettement. Such areas are 
especially contested as to whether or not MK 35 applies. However, even the gazetted areas 
can be controversial. The establishment of national parks, for example, sometimes included 
some form of participation of local forest users. The levels of participation vary widely, and 
sometimes the gazettement of national parks has happened against the wishes of local users. 
In West Kalimantan, there are contestations against the borders of Bukit Baka Bukit Raya 
National Park. Village leaders agreed to the establishment of the park without consulting the 
broader community (Myers and Muhajir 2015). This community has submitted its claim for 
hutan adat, including a portion that overlaps with the national park. Communities around 
Lore Lindu National Park in Central Sulawesi were not given the option of the gazettement of 
the park (Myers 2015). Both of these cases have overlapping customary claims over national 
park land and involve incomplete information issued to forest users at the time of 
gazettement, which is also found in other land use change negotiations in Indonesia (cf. 
Myers et al. 2016).  
 
3.3. Claims on concession forests 
Production forests10 comprise 56.5 million hectares of land in Indonesia (Kementerian 
Lingkungan Hidup dan Kehutanan 2015). There is already a case in which hutan adat are 
claimed over a pulpwood concession (Foresthints.news 2017). In another case in Tumbang 
Titi, Ketapang, West Kalimantan, conflict arose among villagers within several villages 
around a corporate forest concession established in 2011. There are overlapping claims 
among individuals, families, and villages as customary land users and the concession holders 
(Prabowo et al. 2017). According to local claimants, the central government was aware of the 
contested land tenure prior to issuing the licence to the company. Despite this knowledge, 
according to plantation firm insiders, the government has preferred to refrain from mediation 
and leave it to the communities and the companies to sort out these issues amongst 
themselves, a condition also found elsewhere in Indonesia (cf. Myers et al. 2016; Maryudi et 
al. 2016; Maryudi and Krott 2012).   
 
In 2016, the Ministry of Agrarian and Spatial Planning issued a regulation that would enable 
communal rights (hak komunal) on estate crop land (Permen Agraria 10/2016). This could 
afford a similar right to claimants (customary and non-customary) on land that has been 
released from State forests (e.g., oil palm plantations), but claimants on forestland under 
commercial concessions remain challenged to exercise their constitutional claims.  
                                                            
10 Including production forests and limited production forests. 
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3.4. Forest users with statutory management rights in the 
forest 
Restrictions on the customary access of forest people have occurred due to decentralisation 
during precolonial times, postcolonial times, and post-independence  for several reasons 
(Barr 2006; Arnscheidt 2009; Safitri 2010). Since then, ultimate power over forestland has 
been in the hands of the State. Conflict has emerged as customary rights and villagers’ access 
to forestland are neglected (Safitri 2010). However, since the BAL of 1960, the 
marginalisation of adat societies has been due mainly to the allocation of forest concessions 
to forest companies, mining companies, and oil plant plantation firms by the State. NGOs and 
customary community organisations have made repeated calls for agrarian reform and created 
several land rights movements, claiming the recognition and affirmation of the fundamental 
right to lands to little avail.    
 
Some communities with customary claims in State forests have been awarded forest 
management rights by subnational officials on behalf of the MoEF (see section 3.1). 
Depending on the district, these management rights take the form of community or village 
forests (hutan kemasyarakatan and hutan desa, respectively). Management rights can be 
allocated to production and protection forests. In both cases, communities gain management 
rights under strict government monitoring; however, ownership rights are not transferred to 
communities.11 
 
Some communities reject any benefits from the State for fear that acceptance of any benefits 
would serve to legitimise the rights of the State to make land use decisions on customary 
land. Others make agreements with the State, signalling acceptance that the State has the 
authority to issue land use permits on customary land (cf. Lund 2011). The question, then, is 
how does acceptance of this authority affect customary rights land use claims? 
Forest management schemes issue management rights over forests in accordance with 
‘scientific forestry principles,’ negating claims of customary ownership and control (FKKM 
and HUMA 2012). The MoEF’s regulations on social forestry have been used by the State as 
evidence of its commitment to empower forest-dependent people and as a strategy to slow 
deforestation. However, this commitment is supported by insufficient resources for effective 
implementation. The MoEF’s strategic plan for social forestry targets 12.7 million hectares 
under social forestry by 2019 under the new government. The previous government target in 
2010–2014 was 500,000 hectares. By June 2012, only 83,401 hectares had been established 
as hutan desa (Kementerian Kehutanan 2013), and by the end of 2014, only 318,024 hectares 
of hutan desa had been established (Kompas 2015). The reasons for the delays in issuing 
community management rights are too many to go into detail here (see Intarini et al. 2014).  
Community-managed forestry regulations fail to address the fundamental issue of land tenure 
security because they only transfer usage rights (not ownership rights) to communities. These 
rights are fragile at best. They are highly conditional on the approved plans and monitoring 
by district and provincial level departments of forestry (Maryudi 2015a). Therefore, 
communities lack control over access and are only empowered to maintain the ability to 
benefit from the forest within the plans approved by the government. For instance, if a 
community forest management group wishes to access timber resources from the forest under 
its management, its statutory standing to do so is contingent on the following conditions: (a) 
the area of forest being designated is one in which timber extraction is permissible (i.e., not a 
                                                            
11 See MoF regulation P. 49/Menhut-II/2008 for details. 
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protected forest area); (b) timber harvesting is included in its government-approved plan; and 
(c) approved permits exist for the planned timber extraction activities. The activities that are 
permissible within community-management permits are still controlled by the MoEF and its 
regional counterparts. 
 
According to our research initiatives, the advantages of forest management schemes to 
communities tend to be the protection of land from encroaching extractive industries, 
including primarily oil palm, logging, mining, and other industrial plantations (Myers et al. 
2016).  Thus far, communities holding hutan desa, hutan kemasyarakatan, and hutan 
tanaman rakyat permits are not explicitly exempt from making hutan adat claims. In many 
ways, they are in a position of advantage, learning from the management rights processes. 
For example, in Beringin Rayo, Ketapang, West Kalimantan, a village regulation on hutan 
desa is in place. A forest management institution has been created, and a village team 
mapped out forest territories and boundaries designated for hutan desa (including commons 
and individual ownership). Further, the village regulation is passed through the district 
government and then to the legal bureau and a series of review boards, often taking years to 
complete. Many of these experiences prepare the community to meet State requirements for 
hutan adat claims. 
 
The costs, however, are the legitimisation of the State’s control over land (cf. Sikor and Lund 
2009). As communities grasp at strategies to protect their forests against extractive industries, 
they find themselves making deals for short-term permission to use their own land, conceding 
that the State has the authority to set the conditions under which the forestland can be used. 
This logic directly conflicts with the Constitutional Court rulings that clearly state that hutan 
adat should be considered as outside State forests.  
 
A second cost to these schemes could be the definition of the boundaries of forestland under 
the management and future control of communities. The boundaries of hutan desa, hutan 
kemasyarakatan, and hutan tanaman rakyat are negotiated between forest users and the 
district, provincial, or central governments granting the permit. Forest users typically propose 
an area, and the MoEF considers the proposal, including the extent to which the land is ‘clear 
and clean’ of contesting claims. If customary communities claim a more expansive area than 
that which was negotiated for the management rights (or overlap the area with management 
rights), claims may be made more difficult because smaller territories have already been 
agreed upon for forest management. Claims made outside of these areas could be dismissed 
by the government in claims for hutan adat. In Desa Beringin Rayo, hutan desa was 
established in 2011 in a protected forest. According to villagers, part of this hutan desa is in 
what they consider to be hutan adat. An NGO helped them to acquire hutan desa 
management rights, and they have not claimed any hutan adat to the State.  According to 
interviews with local NGOs and government officials, if the community would want to 
convert hutan desa management rights to become hutan adat, this could be considered only if 
(a) the hutan desa boundaries are within the hutan adat territory claim; (b) the district 
government recognises the hutan adat claim; and (c) the community is no longer holding 
hutan desa management rights. The Constitutional Court decision on claiming hutan adat as 
titled forests was made a year after the award of hutan desa management rights to the village. 
However, the community was not aware that hutan adat could be claimed, and local 
respondents suggested that they would not have applied for hutan desa if hutan adat were an 
option. They are concerned about the problematic conversion from management to ownership 
rights. This situation, according to local NGOs and community leaders, has become 
problematic for any future claims for hutan adat.  
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3.5. Transmigrant and forced migrant claims over 
forestland 
Indonesia has had various transmigration programmes since colonial times, responsible for 
moving millions of Indonesians. The Dutch relocated communities so that the communities 
could be better monitored and more easily ‘modernised,’ which included conversion to 
Christianity (Li 2007) at a local scale, and so that the population pressures on Java within the 
colony could be reduced (Fearnside 1997). After independence, and especially under the New 
Order Soeharto era (1967–1998), transmigration programmes were intended to increase the 
productivity of underutilised land by offering it to small holders willing to work the land (Li 
2011). Transmigration also aimed to reduce ethnic contrasts among the islands so that 
citizens would identify themselves as Indonesian rather than by minority ethnic groups 
(Fearnside 1997). Another motivation for the continuation of the program was to move 
people out of areas designated for forest conservation (Elmhirst 2011). Post-New Order, the 
program continued but pivoted its proposition to be a source of cheap labour to investors 
willing to invest in outlying islands. These investments included commercial crops, such as 
oil palm (Li 2011), which required labour, often on former State forests. 
 
The focus of this analysis is on migrants who were translocated during the New Order to 
forest or forest-adjacent areas. Some of these communities have been established for almost 
50 years. These groups are distinct from voluntary migrants in that, in addition to being 
forcefully relocated, they comprise the majority of the population in several localities, often 
with a cohesive ethnic identity. Each family was issued land that they were expected to farm 
(see IPAC 2013 and Fearnside 1997). The scheme was criticised for its impacts on the 
environment since many of the newly established villages were in forest areas, which were 
perceived by the government to be less contested by customary land claims (Fearnside 1997). 
This led to deforestation for the creation of settlements and the opening of farm land. Another 
problem with the scheme, which was only experienced later, was a lack of consideration for 
population growth. Many villages composed of transmigrants experience severe pressures on 
land. The original two hectares per family that were issued (at least after 1996, with amounts 
less clear or standardised before that) have been divided among two and now three 
generations. This leaves insufficient land for household agriculture, and expansion is not 
always permitted by the State, especially when the settlements border forestland.  
Therefore, many villagers have turned to adjacent forestland for their daily needs. In a 
Sumbawa village visited by the lead author of this paper, the community was forced to 
migrate to make way for a national park in Lombok 20 years ago. According to community 
members, the forest was cleared 25 years ago and not replanted. Upland from the village, the 
bare soil turned to scrubland and resulted in frequent flooding in the new village. Seeing an 
opportunity both to use land and to reforest the forestland with trees, villagers restocked the 
forest using their own labour and fruit tree seedlings. According to accounts of villagers, the 
fruit trees provided stable food supplies, access to fuelwood, and protection from flooding. 
However, they are in constant conflict with the forest police, who arrest any villager in the 
designated forest area carrying so much as a machete. 
 
According to a new regulation created jointly by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, MoEF, 
Public Works, and the National Land Agency (79/2014; PB.3/Menhut-11/2014; 
17/PRT/M/2014; 8/SKB/X/2014), transmigrants for more than 20 years have the “right to 
land” (Article 8(1)), yet it is not clear what this right entails. One of the conditions to make a 
hutan adat claim is that there are customary institutions in place for the management of the 
forest. “We have no customary law,” claimed a community leader in Sumbawa. “We are 
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transmigrants.” So tied is custom to land that even the villagers themselves have become 
disconnected with their customary laws as they were separated from their land. The village 
can make no claim to customary land since their homeland is in a national park where they no 
longer live. Like the other forest users in this section, most of whom are marginalised in 
multiple ways, the Constitutional Court rulings are of no benefit. 
 
4. Discussion, conclusions, and policy 
recommendations 
This review has examined the three Constitutional Court decisions that have rejuvenated 
many customary forest users’ hope for controlling their customary land. While the decisions 
are something in which the ‘adat community’ can surely relish, the process for recognition 
has been slow. In this review, we show that while the decisions are positive for the claims of 
customary users, many groups of forest users remain excluded. Specifically, communities 
making claims on land that has already been removed from State forestland, conservation 
forests, forests issued to companies by concessions, and land over which they already have 
management rights, as well as transmigrant communities, have been excluded. We also 
demonstrated that although the process for developing guidelines and issuing hutan adat 
claims has been a slow one, the MoEF has been aggressively gazetting State forests, which 
will present challenges for hutan adat claims in the future. In this brief discussion, we 
highlight some other issues that may arise in adat areas before covering some policy 
recommendations. 
 
Adat means customary, not communal. Although often interpreted as such, it is erroneous to 
assume that customary means communal, and it cannot be equated with concepts of equality. 
Historically, Indonesia’s access to natural resources has been managed by elites built on 
social contracts between rulers and subjects with varying results for the protection of forests 
(Thoms 2008; Henley 2007). This means that divergent interests are at stake and that 
priorities may serve to increase inequality and environmental degradation within hutan adat. 
Customary forest permits issued by the province of Central Kalimantan highlight some of the 
ways local users may choose to redefine ownership of land. In one case, the chief (damang) 
favoured issuing land permits for customary lands under individual ownership rather than 
communal ownership due to the lack of communal land titling regulations at the time. This 
effectively privatised formerly communal customary land and has been practiced both inside 
and outside forest areas by district authorities (Savitri 2013).  
 
There remains considerable uncertainty about what communities will be able to do with their 
newly acquired statutory rights, even with the nine approved hutan adat areas. Issues have 
already arisen as local communities prepare to make their hutan adat claims. In one case in 
Central Kalimantan, an afforestation concession holder was approached by the local 
community to support their claim for hutan adat within the concession. Anticipating that the 
concession holder may not be overly enthusiastic to release land to the community, they 
offered a profit-sharing arrangement. According to their plan, the profit to be shared would 
be derived from the gold mine that they would establish in a formerly protected forest. Others 
have also raised this issue, which was particularly salient when there was a dispute as to 
whether or not hutan adat would still be included in State forests (see Meijaard 2015). 
We would be remiss to not provide some policy recommendations along with this review. 
The first is to sort out the details of what hutan adat means. This task, along with defining the 
  
- 17 - 
mechanisms by which claims can be made, has been left to the MoEF, which we suggest 
should include more participation and oversight from civil society than has been practiced so 
far if not designated to an independent body. MoEF oversight is counterintuitive from the 
perspective that the Constitutional Court decisions asserted that the State has not sufficiently 
applied constitutional law. The application of the decisions remains tenuous. It is still 
currently within the power of the State to determine whether or not customary communities 
exist, which contrasts with peoples’ right to self-determination as enshrined in the United 
Nations Charter and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which 
Indonesia ratified in 2006. 
 
We urge that progress on culminating the diverse land use maps (known as the OneMap 
System) integrate hutan adat claims, other customary claims, and community land claims and 
contestations. The BRWA, working closely with AMAN, the JKPP, Forest Watch Indonesia 
(FWI), Konsorsium Pendukung Sistem Hutan Kerakyatan (KpSHK), and Sawit Watch (SW), 
has put considerable effort into mapping and preparing claims for hutan adat, but these 
efforts have yet to be formally integrated into national land use planning and operate in 
parallel with State procedures. Related to this, it is unclear how hutan adat are considered 
within the President’s initiative to allocate 12.7 million hectares for social forestry (which 
includes industrial plantations and social forestry). 
Second, the gap between perceptions among different units of government and community 
groups needs to be minimised. There continue to be divergent interpretations of whether or 
not a hutan adat is included in the forest zone. Even as communities mobilise to make their 
hutan adat claims, they do so with incomplete information and with understandings that may 
diverge significantly from the MoEF. 
 
Third, settling land claims where third parties have current management and operational 
licences (i.e., ‘legal’ rights) requires that an arbitrator be established to deal with 
contestations pitted against customary rights that may or may not be acknowledged by the 
State. Since logging and conservation permits are issued by the MoEF, we suggest that the 
arbitrator be an independent body that can accommodate and process the claims in a timely 
manner. Settlements involving the collaboration of licence holders and hutan adat claimants 
should be explored wherever possible. Such settlements may involve less than full 
exploitation of the land under logging permits, for example, so that areas under hutan adat 
can be protected or the benefits from exploitation can be shared with the communities, 
according to specific cases. 
 
Fourth, we argue that provinces and districts are equally accountable to the Constitution as 
the Government of Indonesia. Therefore, taking into account the same BAL and the same 
Constitution, districts should create a similar level of territorial categorisation as hutan adat 
for the groups that we have recognised as unable to benefit from the Constitutional Court 
rulings, as they are outside of State forestland. Some districts have already done this, and 
some have even done so in advance of the Constitutional Court rulings. Land tenure security 
should be a serious concern for land inhabited by transmigrants (which admittedly may 
conflict with customary land tenure) and customary claims on land that has been removed 
from State forestland and converted to general purpose land (usually to support industries 
such as mining and commercial plantations). 
 
Fifth, the process of claiming hutan adat should be accompanied with the appropriate 
resources to assist the claimants to navigate the requirements. This would likely include 
providing assistance to develop maps based on customary usage and documentation of 
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customary forest use regulations and proving customary usage in ways that will qualify 
claims for consideration. While BRWA is doing this within its resources, it is challenged to 
reach all potential claimants while other actors apply for management rights permits on the 
same lands. 
 
Sixth, communities and subnational government officials must be made aware of the 
possibility for communities to claim hutan adat. In our experience, most community leaders 
we have talked with (by 2014) were not yet aware that the Constitutional Court decisions 
have even been made, let alone what the decisions could mean to them. As we discussed in 
this paper, hutan adat options are often not well communicated, even when gazetting 
forestland.  
 
The Constitutional Court decisions were groundbreaking in the State’s recognition of 
customary land claims. Although they pertain to forests, they may pave the way for 
customary claims on non-forestland also, thereby potentially benefiting communities in the 
situations we discuss in this paper. We remain cautiously optimistic that the Constitutional 
Court decisions have clarified the rights of customary land holders to gain statutory land 
tenure if our recommendations (and the calls of others) are taken seriously. If not, the 
decisions could spark momentary optimism among communities that could briefly ignite a 
fire that is easily be smothered in bureaucratic red tape, inadequate support to claimants, and 
political obstructions. This momentum could propel changes that broaden the recognition of 
marginalised communities’ rights over State forests. 
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